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A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare (“TFSW”) is a brilliant book. The
authors, Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet, are world-class so-
cial choice theorists, and this book will burnish their reputations as 
leading figures in the field. 
The key concept of TFSW is that of the “social ordering function” 
(SOF). This represents a major intellectual extension of the literature 
on so-called “fair allocation.” (Thomson, 2011). That literature seeks 
to identify allocations of goods that are not only optimal, in the sense
of being Pareto efficient, but satisfy fairness properties—more specifi-
cally properties that do not presuppose utility numbers which are
cardinal or interpersonally comparable (for short, “ONC” fairness 
properties). One well-known such ONC property of fair allocation 
theory is “no envy”: the selected optimal allocation should be such 
that no person prefers anyone else’s bundle to his own. Another is 
“equal split selection”: if an equal division of the total feasible stock 
of goods is optimal, then it should be selected. 
TFSW seeks to identify a rule for ordering all possible allocations, 
not merely optimal ones: a rule that takes the form of an ordering (a 
transitive, reflexive and complete binary relation on allocations); that 
is Paretian in the sense of satisfying the Pareto indifference axiom and 
the strong or at least weak Pareto axiom; and that satisfies fairness 
properties that are both ONC properties, and capture some intuitive 
sense of what makes one allocation of goods more fair or equal than 
another. 
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The book makes a large contribution to at least three literatures: 
not only fair allocation theory, but Arrovian social choice theory and, 
finally, egalitarian welfare economics. Arrow’s theorem and exten-
sions (e.g., to economic domains; see Bordes and Le Breton 1989) 
show that a Paretian nondictatorial social ordering of outcomes, de-
fined just as a function of individuals’ ordinal preferences, is impos-
sible (given sufficient diversity of preferences), if the ordering must 
also conform to a strong independence requirement (“independence 
of irrelevant alternatives”). TFSW demonstrates the possibility of a 
Paretian nondictatorial—indeed, fairness-regarding—ordering of 
allocations, defined on ordinal preferences, and notwithstanding the 
diversity thereof, if a slightly weaker (but still demanding) independ-
ence requirement is substituted for Arrow’s version. And, as I will 
explore further in a moment, TFSW substantially enriches our under-
standing both of the “Pigou-Dalton” principle (surely a key compo-
nent of any adequate account of equality), and the place in egalitari-
anism of maximin or leximin approaches that give absolute priority to 
the worst- or worse-off. 
TFSW is rigorous and axiomatic, in the best tradition of social 
choice theory. It delivers a stunning array of impossibility results or 
logical implications. But the presentation is also very accessible. Re-
sults are expressed both formally and in English. What drives them is 
made clear with many helpful graphs. Long proofs are relegated to an 
appendix.  
Parts I and II develop the SOF concept in the “pure distribution” 
context: society has some stock of goods, already produced, and the 
comparative fairness of different possible allocations of this total 
stock now needs to be determined. Part III shows how the ideas de-
veloped in the first two parts can be extended to scenarios where 
production decisions remain to be made. For example, individuals 
can increase the stock of goods through labor, or private resources 
can be taxed by government to fund a public good. Parts I and II 
(chapters 1-7) are the intellectual core of TFSW, and shall be the focus 
of my comments. Part III (chapters 8-11) is icing on a very rich cake.  
In the “pure distribution” context, TFSW defines the SOF as fol-
lows. (My presentation, here and below, generally follows the TFSW 
notation, making a few slight changes where a simpler symbolism 
suffices for my purpose.) There are l ≥ 2 kinds of goods, and N indi-
viduals. The social endowment of goods is Ω, an l-dimensional vec-
tor. An allocation z of goods specifies a bundle zi for each individual i,
with such bundle having l components. Each good is most naturally
thought of as some kind of transferrable physical item (although 
TFSW in chapter 7 discusses how to extend the model to internal, 
nontransferable “functionings”), and is represented by a nonnegative 
number. An allocation is feasible if the total amount of each of the l
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goods (summed across the N individuals) is less than or equal to the
amount in Ω.  
Each individual i has preferences Ri, namely a complete ordering
of all possible bundles. These are assumed to be continuous, mono-
tonic and (to begin with) convex. RN is the N-fold profile of these
preferences. An “economy” E is a pair (RN, Ω), and a SOF (denoted in
bold as R) is a mapping from economies to orderings of allocations. 
That is, an SOF R takes the form R(E) = R(RN, Ω). z R(E) z* is short-
hand for: according to the ordering of allocations generated by SOF R
from economy E, allocation z is at least as good as allocation z*.
It is critical to note that SOFs have two arguments: not just profiles
of preferences (a familiar idea from multiprofile social choice theory 
going back to Arrow), but also social endowments.  
Chapter 1 presents the SOF concept, and situates it relative to fair 
allocation theory and Arrovian social choice, as well as other compo-
nents of welfare economics (such as social welfare functions, cost-
benefit analysis, and multidimensional methods). Chapter 2 explores 
different versions of the Pigou-Dalton (PD) principle. This principle, 
generically, concerns a transfer of some “currency,” from a transferor 
who starts out with more, to a transferee who starts out with less, 
which satisfies two properties: it is “non-leaky” in the sense that the 
transferee gains by precisely as much as the transferor loses; and it is 
small enough that even after the transfer the transferee has no more 
of the currency than the transferor. Chapter 2, specifically, discusses 
versions of the PD principle framed in terms of goods. The simplest
version presented in that chapter says: If allocation z* is reached from
z by simultaneous non-leaky transfers in all l goods, from a transferor
with more of each of the l goods, and which leaves the transferee still
with strictly less of each than the transferor (and if no one else’s hold-
ings change), then the SOF must (weakly) prefer z* to z.
Strikingly, this simple version of the PD principle is inconsistent 
with the weak Pareto principle. Chapter 2 is thus led to explore Pare-
to-consistent restrictions thereof, such as: “equal-split transfer,” 
“transfer among equals,” and “nested-contour transfer.” The first 
requires an SOF to satisfy the PD principle in the sense stated in the 
previous paragraph if the transferee ends up with less than 1/N of Ω
in each good, and the transferor with more. The second does so if the
transferee and transferor have the same preferences. The third, a 
strengthening of the second, does so if the transferee’s post-transfer
indifference curve is strictly below the transferor’s. 
Note that all four versions of the PD principle just discussed are 
ONC principles: the simple principle is framed in terms of transfers of 
physical quantities of goods, not utilities; and the restrictions in the
latter three versions are either good-based (in the case of equal-split 
transfer), or based on ordinal properties of each individual’s prefer-
ences (what her indifference curves look like). 
 80  Revue des livres/Book Review | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 4(1) : 77-85 
Chapter 3 concerns the relation between the PD principle and a 
much stronger absolute priority for the worse off. It contains two
landmark theorems. “Priority among equals” is an absolute-priority 
principle that says: if in allocation z one individual, the transferee, has
less of all l goods than a second, the transferor; and if a transfer (how-
ever leaky) occurs such that in z* the transferee’s holdings of each of
the goods have increased by some amount, and the transferor’s have 
decreased by some amount, and the transferee remains with less than 
the transferor in all l dimensions, with no one else’s holding changed;
and if the two individuals have the same preferences, then: z* is weak-
ly socially preferred to z. Theorem 3.1 shows that if an SOF satisfies
Pareto indifference, transfer among equals, and “unchanged-contour 
independence”, then it satisfies “priority among equals.”  
Unchanged-contour independence, a weakened version of the Ar-
row “independence of irrelevant alternatives” requirement, forms 
one of the linchpins of TFSW. Deriving originally from work by 
Hansson (1973), it here says: if two economies E and Eʹ contain the
same Ω and contain profiles of preferences, RN and RN+, such that for
all N individuals each individual i’s indifference curves in RN and RN+
are the same at his bundle zi and the same at his bundle zi*, then the
SOF must not differentiate between these economies at these bundles: 
z R(E) z* iff z R(Eʹ) z*. Unchanged-contour independence not only
figures centrally in Theorem 3.1, but is satisfied by the two main SOFs 
highlighted by TFSW: RΩlex and REW, to be described momentarily. 
Theorem 3.1 shows, astonishingly, that Paretianism plus a minimal 
ONC egalitarian requirement (transfer among equals) plus a robust-
ness requirement (independence) yields a kind of absolute priority. 
To be sure, this robustness requirement is contestable, as I’ll discuss. 
But Theorem 3.2 traces a different path from Paretian ONC egalitari-
anism to absolute priority. “Nested-contour priority” is the absolute-
priority analogue of nested-contour transfer, favoring a transfer 
(however leaky) as long as the transferee’s post-transfer indifference 
curve lies strictly below the transferor’s. Theorem 3.2 shows that if an 
SOF satisfies Pareto indifference and nested-contour transfer, and is 
separable with respect to unaffected individuals (in the sense of being 
invariant to both their holdings and preferences), then it satisfies 
nested-contour priority. Robustness has been swapped out for sepa-
rability (harder to contest), and yet we still get absolute priority. 
Chapter 4 addresses the social-endowment sensitivity of SOFs; 
considers variations on “unchanged contour independence”; and 
discusses in depth the difference between SOFs and fair allocation 
rules. Chapter 5 describes two favored SOFs, RΩlex and REW. Each con-
verts an allocation z into an N-fold vector of individual indices. In the
case of RΩlex, individual i’s index is the fraction λi such that i is indif-
ferent between that fractional share of Ω and zi. In the case of REW,
individuals i’s index is zi converted into money at certain Ω-relative
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(and allocation-relative) prices. RΩlex applies the leximin rule to its 
indices, while REW the maximin rule. 
In both cases, the indices might be termed “utilities,” since they 
are numerical representations of preferences, but if so are ordinal and 
interpersonally noncomparable “utilities.” They are generated from 
the profile RN of individual ordinal rankings of bundles, plus the so-
cial endowment Ω. Thus, if U is an N-fold vector of individual utility 
functions (u1(.), …, uN(.)), and U* a profile of individual-specific ordi-
nal transformations thereof (f1(u1(.),…., fN(uN(.))—with fi(.) any strictly 
increasing function— REW and RΩlex using utility functions rather than 
preferences as initial inputs (and then inferring the profile of prefer-
ences RN from those utility functions) are invariant to the substitution 
of U* for U.  
 REW satisfies Pareto indifference, weak Pareto, and nested contour 
transfer and priority in their weak forms. All three “weaks” can be 
strengthened to “strong” with a leximin extension of REW, but doing 
so has problematic implications in terms of separability. Moreover, 
chapter 6 shows that REW is problematic with nonconvex preferences. 
RΩlex satisfies Pareto indifference, strong Pareto, and nested contour 
transfer and priority in their strong forms; is fully separable with re-
spect to unaffected individuals; and generalizes nicely to nonconvex 
economies. All in all, RΩlex—the SOF analogue of the concept of “egal-
itarian equivalence” in fair allocation theory—seems to emerge the 
winner from TFSW’s tournament of axioms. 
RΩlex is social-endowment sensitive. Ω, a feature of the economy—
the total stock of distributable goods—is not merely a formal argu-
ment of RΩlex as for any SOF. RΩlex is such that its ranking of alloca-
tions for a given profile of preferences can vary as Ω does. However, it 
should be noted that RΩlex as well as REW are invariant to multiplica-
tion of Ω by a positive constant. They thus take account of the relative 
proportions of goods in Ω, as well as preferences, in ranking alloca-
tions.  
The Arrow problem, sensu stricto, is to arrive at a single ranking of 
a set of social states for each profile of preferences. RΩlex and REW, be-
cause they are social-endowment sensitive, do not actually demon-
strate how this problem can be solved by weakening the “independ-
ence of irrelevant alternatives” requirement to unchanged-contour 
independence. But a related SOF which is discussed (although not 
endorsed) by TFSW does illustrate this. This SOF, RΩ0lex, follows the 
same approach as RΩlex, but using an arbitrary, fixed stock of goods Ω0 
rather than the economy’s stock Ω. 
Chapters 6 and 7 extend the analysis of the first chapters to vari-
ous specific economics domains (nonconvexity, indivisible goods, 
homothetic preferences), and in other directions. 
An “internal” critique of TFSW—internal to the project of describ-
ing social orderings that build upon the intellectual tradition of the 
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fair-allocation literature—appears impossible. To the eyes of this re-
viewer (admittedly not someone who writes in the fair-allocation 
tradition), TFSW seems to have fully succeeded at this project. The 
more important criticism is “external,” namely that the SOF frame-
work has built-in flaws which are avoidable by using a social welfare 
function to rank vectors of interpersonally comparable utilities corre-
sponding to allocations, if a normatively plausible construction of 
such utilities is available.  
Assume, for the moment, that a plausible utility function u(.) with 
the following features can indeed be constructed: (1) u(.) maps pairs 
of bundles and preferences onto utility numbers. u(.) = u(b, R), with b 
a bundle (a vector of the l goods) and R a preference. (2) For different 
bundles with the same preferences, u(.) conforms to the preference. 
u(b, R) ≥ u(b*, R) iff b R b*. (3) u(.) is unique or at least unique up to a 
positive ratio transformation. 
If so, u(.) can be used to define a “fair social welfare function” W, 
which is a mapping from a profile of preferences onto a complete 
ordering of allocations. Define W as follows. z W(RN) z*—to be read 
as “z at least as good as z* according to W, given preferences RN”—iff 
 
 
 
with g(.) a strictly increasing and strictly concave real-valued func-
tion. (For a general discussion, see Adler 2012, ch. 5). 
If u(.) is unique up to a ratio transformation, g(.) can be the power 
function g(x) = (1–γ)−1x1−γ, with γ positive. W with this particular g(.) 
function will order allocations the very same way, for a given profile 
of preferences, if u(.) is replaced with u*(.) = ku(.), k positive. If u(.) is 
fully unique, any strictly increasing and strictly concave g(.) can be 
used. Note that the utilities assigned by u(.) in either case are cardinal 
and interpersonally comparable, since the only admissible transfor-
mation is either a ratio rescaling with a common positive k, or none at 
all. 
Because u(.) by hypothesis has been constructed to conform to R, 
W shares with RΩlex the virtue of satisfying both the Pareto indiffer-
ence and the strong Pareto axioms. Like RΩlex, it is separable with re-
spect to unaffected individuals (being invariant to changes in either 
their holdings or preferences). However, it lacks two features of RΩlex 
that some egalitarians, at least, will find problematic. First, many find 
the PD principle compelling, but are troubled by absolute priority for 
the worse- or even worst-off. W satisfies the PD principle in utility. If 
i, j, z, and z* are such that u(zi, Ri) > u(zi*, Ri ) ≥ u(zj*, Rj) > u(zj, Rj), and 
u(zi, Ri) − u(zi*, Ri) = u(zj*, Rj) − u(zj, Rj), with everyone else indifferent 
between z and z*, then W strictly prefers z* to z. However, W does not 
give absolute priority to those at lower utility levels, and the extent of 
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priority it gives (how leaky a utility transfer can be to be acceptable) 
can be adjusted by changing the concavity of g(.). Whether W gives 
absolute priority with respect to transfers of goods (not utility) is not 
so straightforward. But it is easy to see that if u(.) as well as the trans-
formation function g(.) are unbounded above, W will not give abso-
lute priority in terms of goods. A loss to one with fewer goods will be 
a finite loss in transformed utility, which (given the unboundedness 
assumptions) can be counterbalanced by a sufficiently large increase 
in the holdings of someone with more goods. 
Second, the social-endowment sensitivity of RΩlex is puzzling, in-
deed doubly so. Let Z(Ω) be the set of allocations whose sums of each 
of the l goods are less than or equal to the amounts in Ω. TFSW char-
acterizes each allocation within Z(Ω) as “feasible.” Even if this is true, 
the classical approach to rational choice is to maximize the attainment 
of the decision maker’s objective given feasibility constraints, rather 
than to build constraints into the description of the objective. W as-
sumes this classical form, since it makes the goal (the identification of 
better or worse allocation) depend upon individuals’ preferences, but 
not on Ω itself.  
But, in fact, it cannot be true that every allocation within Z(Ω) is 
feasible. If this were the case, the Paretian social planner would be 
irrational to choose any Pareto inefficient allocation in Z(Ω), one that 
is Pareto inferior to some other allocation in Z(Ω). The very justifica-
tion for an SOF approach that ranks all allocations in Z(Ω), according 
to TFSW, is that the social planner might find herself forced to choose 
between two allocations z and z* both of which are Pareto-inefficient 
in Z(Ω), and might have good reason to choose one or the other. But 
this can only be the case if there are hidden feasibility constraints, not 
explicitly included in the “pure distribution” model of TFSW. Ω iden-
tifies the total stock of goods that exist within the society in question, 
but administrative costs, political economy considerations, the threat 
of violence by those who currently possess goods, etc., prevents their 
redistribution.  
Wouldn’t it be a better approach for the social planner to rank al-
locations as a function of individual well-being (determined by allo-
cations and preferences), and then choose among them with a view to 
what’s actually feasible—rather than to make the ranking a function 
of an Ω that is “feasibly” distributable only in a hypothetical world 
different from the one the planner actually finds herself in, a hypothet-
ical world lacking the actual feasibility constraints that make it ra-
tional for her (in her world) to choose an allocation Pareto inefficient 
in Z(Ω)? 
In chapter 4, TFSW gives a partial riposte to this skeptical line of 
questioning. Assume that Ω is genuinely feasible, and that the social 
planner is therefore rationally constrained (if she is Paretian) to 
choose a Pareto-efficient allocation in Z(Ω). If her social ordering is 
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just a Ω-independent function of individual preferences and alloca-
tions, and satisfies weak Pareto, then Theorem 4.1 shows that the or-
dering may fail to choose an equal split of Ω even if it is Pareto-
efficient. But the proponent of W has a ready response: individuals 
with equal bundles at a Pareto-efficient allocation may have (globally 
if not locally) different preferences, and thus different utilities as as-
signed by the hypothesized u(.) that takes preferences as well as bun-
dles as its arguments. An equal split in resources, even if Pareto effi-
cient, does not necessarily leave individuals with diverse preferences 
equal in terms of interpersonally comparable well-being. 
Finally, it is worth comparing W and RΩlex with respect to the ro-
bustness property that is central to TFSW: unchanged-contour inde-
pendence. There is no particular reason to think that W will have this 
property, but this does not seem especially troubling. Consider the 
case in which u(.) is unique up to a positive ratio transformation. u(.) 
assigns determinate utility ratios between any two pairings of prefer-
ences and bundles. In particular, u(.) will assign determinate utility 
ratios between any two indifference curves of the same particular 
preference R. That ratio, intuitively, may depend upon the overall 
pattern of indifference curves for that preference. But “unchanged 
contour independence” requires, in this context, that if two given 
indifference curves (specified by the bundles they connect) belong to 
some preference, the utility ratios between the two curves must be the 
same regardless of the preference to which they belong. If utility is indeed 
interpersonally comparable on a ratio scale, that seems like a very 
strong and unwarranted demand. 
So we come back to the hypothesized u(.). The “external critique” 
of TFSW that I have set forth hinges upon the availability of such a 
utility function. In other work, building upon John Harsanyi’s con-
cept of “extended preferences,” I have outlined an approach to con-
structing utilities that are interpersonally comparable, determine utili-
ty ratios, and take account of individuals’ preferences. I cannot dis-
cuss the details here. (Adler 2012, ch. 3; Harsanyi 1986, ch. 4). What-
ever its promise, the approach is hardly well-established. Nor is any 
other. It must be conceded that the proponents of social welfare func-
tions currently lack an established, consensus account for arriving at 
an interpersonally comparable measure of individual well-being that 
is both sensitive to individual preferences, and allows for the diversi-
ty thereof. 
So the “external critique” is perhaps not a “critique” at all. It 
shows how the SOF lacks certain arguable virtues of a methodology 
for social choice, the social welfare function, which is itself still a 
“work in progress.” And, again, the “critique” (if it is one) is external, 
not internal. In writing TFSW, Fleurbaey and Maniquet aspired to 
fully develop the concept of an SOF. They have succeeded masterful-
ly in that aim. For those (such as this author) who remain inclined 
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toward alternative approaches, TFSW will function as both spur and 
exemplar—challenging us to draw blueprints for our favored meth-
odologies that are as precise and elegant as the blueprint Fleurbaey 
and Maniquet have set down for theirs. 
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